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Research continues to confirm what intuition has told many of us for years: Teacher qual-ity has a bigger impact on student learning 
than any other factor in a school. Nationwide, this 
finding has increasingly motivated policymakers and 
the public to focus reforms on dramatically improv-
ing teacher quality. National, state, and local leaders 
have initiated reforms designed to better prepare 
teachers for the classroom, more accurately identify 
and reward top teachers, support teachers’ develop-
ment, and equip education leaders to identify and 
remove the very least-effective teachers. 
Discussions of teacher quality often lead to ques-
tions about which teachers are retained and dis-
missed in K–12 public schools, and thus to questions 
about tenure. Teacher tenure was designed in the 
early 1900s as a set of procedural protections against 
unfair and arbitrary dismissals.1 But today, concerns 
about the effect on student outcomes — along with 
budgetary constraints — dominate education reform 
discussions.
As a result, leaders in a handful of states and 
districts have begun making changes to align their 
tenure systems with their goal of increasing student 
learning. Common changes include streamlining 
tenure protections and increasing the rigor of the 
tenure-granting process.2 Parallel efforts to improve 
the quality, accuracy, and rigor of educator evalu-
ations have strengthened the basis for personnel 
decisions based on performance, and have fueled 
increased interest in tenure reform.
As education leaders move from questions of 
whether to reform tenure to how, they will need bet-
ter information about how tenure design can best 
help students succeed. 
This paper examines two other sectors that have 
a long history with tenure — the civil service and 
higher education. In the civil service, tenure-like job 
protections apply to nonpolitical positions in both 
state and federal governments. At colleges and uni-
versities, people in many faculty positions can receive 
tenure. Here, we examine the purposes of tenure 
and the tenure design elements in both of these set-
tings and explore how they help or hinder an organi-
zation’s goals. 
Based on these lessons, and in light of today’s 
imperative for better student learning, we then offer 
a set of reform options for K–12 education leaders 
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Could redesigned tenure actually  
improve student learning? Could it  
grow the size and power of a high- 
performing teacher corps?
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who are committed to changing tenure systems to 
improve student results. The two major paths are re-
forming tenure and eliminating tenure while add-
ing enticements attractive to effective teachers. We 
discuss the elements of tenure design: the time before 
tenure is considered; the criteria for obtaining ten-
ure; the tenure process; the protections that tenure 
provides; and the strength of other career advance-
ment and reward opportunities for better teachers. 
Table 2 summarizes the elements of tenure design 
that may be changed. Table 3 presents one model 
of “Elite Tenure,” focused on growing the size 
and power of a high-performing teaching corps. 
We also discuss options for reformers who decide to 
eliminate tenure altogether.
Reformers choosing either route also will need to 
plan transitions well. States have limited powers to 
remove tenure from teachers who already have it, but 
they can leap into the future with tenure approaches 
for new teachers that fit the demands of education 
today. The best transitions will pair tenure changes 
with career and pay opportunities that encourage 
current teachers to voluntarily relinquish tenure and 
focus on excellence at work every year.
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Why do organizations have tenure?* In the civil service and universities, much as in K–12 public schools, tenure was 
originally developed to insulate employees from 
undue political forces and to increase the attractive-
ness of the job.3
Today, institutions of higher education and the 
civil service use tenure or its associated job protec-
tions in part to achieve organizational objectives. 
In both, tenure serves two important purposes: job 
security that attracts and retains talent despite rela-
tively lower pay, and insulation of employees from 
internal and external political forces that may harm 
organization performance. In higher education, 
tenure also serves as a reward for achievement, part 
of a package of opportunities that universities use to 
retain top faculty and increase performance.
Job Security to Attract and Retain Staff
Almost all professions today lack the job protections 
that tenure provides for the civil service and higher 
education. As in K–12 education, employee quality 
largely determines the quality of the civil service and 
higher education. To support strong organization 
performance, these sectors must attract good people 
despite relatively lower pay. Tenure thus provides 
a key benefit, lowering risk and thereby helping to 
attract high-quality candidates who could work 
elsewhere. 
 → In the civil service, job protections are credited 
with making it easier to attract good applicants 
and retain staff in spite of the sector’s compara-
tively low pay.4 Civil service employees continu-
ally report that job security ranks among the top 
reasons to accept federal employment or to stay in 
a federal job.5 In the few states that have decreased 
civil service protections in recent years, manag-
ers often report difficulty with recruitment and 
retention when lack of tenure is coupled with the 
relatively low pay typical of many state-level gov-
ernment positions.6
 → In the university setting, tenure provides eco-
nomic security as part of the overall compensation 
package for existing and prospective employees. 
Many institutions rely upon increased job security 
to attract and retain high performers. The pros-
pect of lifetime job security makes the profession 
more attractive to many applicants and compen-
sates them for giving up the higher salaries they 
could earn elsewhere, particularly in the private, 
for-profit sector.7
What are the Purposes of  Tenure?
* Throughout this report, we use the term “tenure” to refer to the job protections that accompany non-probationary job sta-
tus in both higher education and the civil service. Though these job protections are not typically called “tenure” in the civil 
service, they provide due process rights that limit dismissal, similar to tenured positions in higher education and K–12 public 
schools.
K–12 tenure is granted to nearly all  
teachers, with almost no criteria, and  
within the first few years of teaching. 
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Insulation from Internal and External Politics
In both sectors, one of tenure’s main purposes is 
to insulate employees from political forces that 
may keep the organization from accomplishing its 
mission. 
→ In the civil service, one of the primary purposes 
of tenure is to protect the public from poor ser-
vices that could result if most government em-
ployees were appointed based on friendship and 
political allegiance, regardless of appointees’ quali-
fications. Cronyism was common in earlier phases 
of our nation’s history, and efforts to decrease 
politically-based decisions led to multiple reform 
efforts, including the Pendleton Civil Service Re-
form Act of 1883 and the Civil Service Reform Act 
of 1978, designed to professionalize the civil ser-
vice and guard against such politically-motivated 
decisions.11 
 → In higher education, tenure has a different insu-
lating purpose: to enable faculty to pursue new 
ideas, viewpoints, and research innovations with-
out fear of retribution by academic officials who 
might disagree or whose prior work is diminished 
by new thinking and research.12 Cutting-edge 
thinking and research is critical to the mission of 
many universities. For tenured professors, freedom 
from internal political forces allows them to chal-
lenge the administration on issues of curriculum 
and quality, and to challenge the conventional 
wisdom in their fields without fear of reprisal by 
dismissal.13
Reward for Strong Performance
One significant difference between the university 
and civil service settings is the degree to which ten-
ure rewards achievement, with the goal of improv-
ing employee performance and retaining those who 
perform very well. Many colleges and universities 
are highly selective about who receives tenure. As 
a result, tenure awards bring more than security and 
political insulation — they also confer significant 
status.14 This prestige boosts the attractiveness of 
individual schools and academic positions in general, 
which in turn magnifies the recruitment and reten-
tion of high performers. Unlike other settings such 
as the civil service — in which job protections are 
quite easy to obtain, and therefore confer little status 
— tenure at universities serves the organizational 
goal of increasing the quality of faculties by dispro-
portionately attracting and retaining individuals 
who are likely to succeed.
Historical Purposes of  Tenure in k–12
Tenure emerged in response to the spoils system in public schooling, under which teachers were  
hired (and fired) as a consequence of the political process rather than their competence or fit.8 Advo-
cates intended it to be part of teachers’ total compensation, helping to attract and retain teachers by 
making up for relatively low starting salaries and back-loaded pension benefits through long-term job  
stability.9 Tenure also has strong roots in the women’s rights movement, with the specific aim of  
protecting female teachers.10
Tenure in higher education has been 
used primarily to further the mission 
of colleges and universities.
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Here we examine the design elements of job protections in the civil service and higher education. In both, “tenure” or 
its functional equivalent is not a one-dimensional 
policy. Instead, the systems comprise several design 
elements that affect who receives tenure and what 
protections it affords, including: 
 → Time to tenure: the length of time required to 
become eligible for tenure
 → Criteria to earn tenure: the standards an em-
ployee must meet to receive tenure
 → Process for conferring tenure: the process by 
which eligible candidates are evaluated 
 → Tenure protections: the job security that tenure 
affords, and
 → Other career and reward opportunities: the 
other inducements that institutions use to encour-
age recruitment, retention, and high performance 
of top employees.
In the following sections, we explore each of these 
design elements as they play out in both the civil ser-
vice and higher education.
Time to Tenure
Like K–12 public schools, the civil service and institu-
tions of higher education generally require a particu-
lar number of years of service before an employee is 
eligible to earn tenure. The length of time required 
differs, however, with higher education typically re-
quiring a much longer probationary period than jobs 
in the civil service.
 → Federal permanent employees are generally hired 
into “career-conditional” status, which includes 
a one-year probationary period before they are 
eligible for increased job protections.15 Likewise, 
state and city systems require probationary peri-
ods generally between six months and a year.16
 → At most tenure-granting higher education in-
stitutions, probationary periods last for six or 
seven years.17 This average includes wide variation 
among individual colleges and universities: 54 per-
cent have maximum probationary periods of seven 
years, 28 percent have probationary periods of six 
years, 6 percent have probationary periods of five 
years, and 4 percent have probationary periods of 
more than seven years (see Figure 1).18 
Design Elements of  Tenure Systems
As a tool to strengthen our nation’s 
schools and children’s prospects, tenure 
has failed miserably. What can we learn 








5 years 6 years 7 years > 7 years
figure 1. Length of the Probationary Period at Tenure-
Granting Universities
The average length of the probationary period also differs by 
institution type: research and doctoral institutions typically have 
the longest, with 77 percent requiring seven- or eight-year pro-
bationary periods.19 At four-year colleges, the average is seven 
years; and at community colleges, the average probationary pe-
riod is only three years.20
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Criteria to Earn Tenure
As with the time required for eligibility, the criteria 
to earn tenure differ significantly between the higher 
education and civil service sectors and among indi-
vidual institutions.
→ In the federal civil service and in some cities and 
states, employees gain job protections automati-
cally at the end of their probationary periods. 
Managers do not have to take any affirmative steps 
unless the employee is to be denied job protec-
tions, which rarely happens.21 Indeed, less than 
2 percent of federal workers are removed during 
the probationary period.22 As a result, in the civil 
service, who ultimately gains increased job protec-
tions depends primarily on who is hired.23
 → In most universities, the criteria used to evalu-
ate candidates for tenure are much more rigorous 
and defined. Nearly all institutions of higher 
education consider performance in the same three 
categories: a candidate’s research and scholarship, 
teaching, and service.24 Some institutions also 
take into account other variables such as ethics, 
professionalism, and collegiality.25
•  Research and scholarship: Within this broad 
category, criteria in colleges and universities’ 
tenure decisions typically include the number, 
quality, and prestige of a candidate’s publica-
tions in scholarly journals, books, and reports; 
inventions, patents, or original creations; exter-
nal grants and other fundraising; professional 
activities such as memberships or participation 
on editorial boards; presentations, fellowships, 
awards, workshops, and conferences; and other 
types of recognition and respect by their peers 
in the field.26
•  Teaching: Within this category, criteria usu-
ally relate to the quality of a candidate’s course 
syllabi; success with students (as measured 
through student evaluations, enrollment levels, 
availability for student consultation or advis-
ing, supervision of student research); classroom 
observations (to examine factors such as atmo-
sphere, preparation, presentation, methods, 
organization, and clarity); the candidate’s 
contribution to new courses or new pedagogi-
cal techniques; and teaching awards and other 
forms of recognition.27
• Service: This category typically refers to a can-
didate’s service to students (such as through ad-
vising, counseling, or involvement in extracur-
ricular groups or activities); service to faculty 
(such as through service on committees and 
other governing groups); service to the school 
(participation in committees, recruitment/
admissions, alumni activities, workshops, aca-
demic meetings, or college events); and service 
to the community (including participation in 
civic groups, volunteer service, or professional 
associations).28
Across these criteria, each institution places dif-
ferent weights on scholarship, teaching, service, and 
other factors. Doctoral institutions tend to place the 
highest value on candidates’ published research and 
external grant funding, while other universities, lib-
eral arts colleges, and community colleges typically 
place higher value on teaching success.29
The rigor with which each criterion is judged 
also varies by institution, with top-ranked institu-
tions and programs typically applying the strictest 
standards. Few (if any) universities use a set formula 
for how the criteria are pieced together to arrive at a 
tenure decision, however — indeed, final tenure deci-
sions are generally shrouded in secrecy.30
Key Design Elements of  Tenure in k–12 
Since tenure policies differ across states, one cannot generalize fully about the design elements. In ad-
dition, many states are reviewing their tenure policies as this report goes to press. Still, the following 
description provides a high-level view of how tenure generally works in K–12 education.
Time to tenure. All 50 states mandate probationary periods before teachers are eligible to receive ten-
ure (the District of Columbia does not). Thirty-four states mandate periods of three years; most other 
states range from one year to five. Only Indiana and Missouri require five-year probationary periods; 
Ohio requires seven. In Hawaii and Mississippi, teachers may receive tenure after only one year.31
Criteria to earn tenure. States and districts typically do not follow formal processes for making 
tenure decisions beyond mandating probationary periods before teachers become eligible.32 In most 
districts, continued service during the probationary period is the primary criterion for earning life-
time job protections.33 In 2007, for example, 98.7 percent of New York City teachers eligible to receive 
tenure did receive it.34 Three states (Colorado, Delaware, and Rhode Island) and the District of Co-
lumbia now make evidence of student learning the preponderant criterion in tenure decisions.35
Process for conferring tenure. During each year of their probationary period, most teachers receive 
one or two formal evaluations by principals or other building-level administrators.36 The evaluations 
are not typically part of a formal tenure-granting process, however; after a teacher finishes her pro-
bationary period, tenure is the default. At most, school leaders consider whether teachers should be 
deemed ineligible for tenure. 
Tenure protections. Tenure protects teachers against arbitrary or unfair dismissal, which includes the 
processes required to attempt and complete a dismissal. State laws or collective bargaining agreements 
typically include three requirements: teachers’ right to “notice” of the reasons for dismissal, a hearing, 
and rights to appeal.37 Most states specify “incompetence” or “inadequate performance” as grounds 
for dismissal, although these terms are typically not defined and lead to widely different interpreta-
tions during the dismissal process.38
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Process for Conferring Tenure
In addition to setting the time required to become el-
igible for tenure and the criteria by which candidates 
are evaluated, institutions in both the civil service 
and higher education typically follow a prescribed 
process for conferring tenure awards. Process ele-
ments that differ include the timing and frequency  
of evaluations, and the selection and relative power  
of evaluators with influence over the tenure decision.
 → In both state and federal civil service, the evalu-
ation process during civil servants’ probationary 
period is rigorous in policy, but in practice leads 
to nearly automatic tenure awards. At the federal 
level, supervisors must carefully evaluate each 
employee’s performance at the end of the proba-
tionary period to determine if each is likely to be a 
long-term asset to the agency. Federal regulations 
actually require that supervisors “utilize the pro-
bationary period as fully as possible to determine 
the fitness of the employee” and “terminate [the 
employee’s] services during this period if he fails to 
demonstrate fully his qualifications for continued 
employment.”39 The evaluation process during 
probationary periods at the state level is typically 
designed to be similarly rigorous.40
 In practice, however, government supervisors 
at both levels have been reluctant to use evalua-
tions as the basis for denying increased job protec-
tions — indeed, very few employees are dismissed 
during the probationary period for any reason, 
with a government report finding only 1.6 percent 
of federal competitive service employees dismissed 
during the first year, the typical period of proba-
tion.41 Federal employees and supervisors alike 
typically view evaluations as mere formalities, not 
opportunities to dismiss even poorly performing 
employees.42 In state civil service systems, many 
view the evaluations conducted during employees’ 
probationary period as meaningless.43
 → In higher education, the tenure process is much 
more rigorous, both in policy and practice. Tenure 
denial is the default: Candidates bear the burden 
of proving their qualifications to reviewers before 
receiving the award.44 Faculty who are denied ten-
ure at the end of the probationary period typically 
lose their jobs; most universities follow an “up-or-
out” process.45
 At most colleges and universities, the tenure re-
view process includes several stages of evaluation. 
The first stage includes review by peers and super-
visors at the department level, the second by lead-
ers at the college/school level (if any), and finally 
by the top leadership of the institution.46 At each 
stage, candidates’ tenure files — including formal 
compilations of scholarly work, other evidence of 
performance, and a statement by the candidate 
explaining the coherence, significance, and direc-
tion of his or her scholarship — typically form the 
primary basis for the review.47 At many institu-
tions, especially research universities, the tenure 
process also includes reviews by peers in the candi-
date’s field who work at other universities. Steps to 
reveal evidence of criteria in addition to scholar-
ship are included along the way, such as gathering 
student input (e.g. course evaluations) and letters 
from alumni, observing candidates’ teaching, and 
holding meetings with the candidate and review 
committee members.48
Protections after Tenure
Tenure in the university setting and its practical 
equivalent in the civil service confer a series of ben-
efits that, together, form the level of job protection 
that employees receive. These include the grounds 
for dismissal of employees who have earned tenure 
and the degree of procedural protections granted to 
these employees, which in turn determine the ease or 
complexity of dismissals.
 → In both the federal and state civil service, em-
ployees who have successfully completed their 
probationary period can be dismissed only for 
“just cause,” a high bar that requires employers to 
prepare evidence and specific justification for ter-
mination.49 Some state statutes include seemingly 
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specific language, such as Florida’s: “Cause shall 
include, but not be limited to, negligence, inef-
ficiency or inability to perform assigned duties, 
insubordination, willful violation of the provi-
sions of law or agency rules, conduct unbecoming 
a public employee, misconduct, habitual drug 
abuse, or conviction of any crime involving moral 
turpitude.”50 But even when language seems spe-
cific, the standard for what constitutes “just cause” 
remains fairly vague at both the federal and state 
levels, with application of broad legal terms left to 
arbitrators, hearing officers, and courts.51
 Federal civil service laws require several steps 
before dismissing a permanent employee, many of 
which are similar to the protections provided to 
tenured K–12 teachers. They include: 
• Notice of the dismissal action
•  An opportunity to respond and present 
evidence
• Representation by counsel
•  A written decision from the agency that initi-
ated the dismissal
•  A right to appeal to the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board, and
• A right to judicial review.52 
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State systems vary, but the extent of their pro-
tections stem from constitutional requirements 
and generally resemble the federal protections.53 
Under these protections, less than 0.5 percent of 
federal employees lose their jobs after the proba-
tionary period.54 At the state level, involuntary 
turnover rates average less than 2 percent annu-
ally.55 Data suggest that supervisors rarely risk 
questionable dismissals, and most dismissals are 
upheld upon appeal. In Florida, for example, more 
than 90 percent of civil service dismissals were up-
held throughout the 1990s.56 
 → In universities as well, a tenured professor can be 
dismissed only for “just cause” or other specified 
reasons, including incompetence, neglect of duty, 
or serious misconduct.57 In both public and pri-
vate universities, some faculty handbooks spell out 
permissible reasons for dismissal, the procedures 
for challenging attempted terminations, and im-
permissible reasons for dismissal that would vio-
late academic freedom.58 As in K–12 public educa-
tion and the civil service, specific causes typically 
are not precisely defined, leaving it to arbitrators, 
hearing officers, and courts to apply vague terms 
to specific facts.59 Judges also tend to defer to 
managers’ subjective assessments, focusing instead 
on whether procedures were properly followed.60 
 Procedural protections at universities generally 
include notice, a hearing, and one or more oppor-
tunities for appeal.61 However, an important factor 
in the level of protections afforded is the scope of 
the tenure award — i.e., whether it protects a fac-
ulty member’s position at the department, school, 
or institution level. With higher levels of tenure 
(e.g., university-wide versus campus, department, 
or program-specific) come stronger degrees of job 
security.62 For example, if a department dismissed 
a faculty member who received tenure at the insti-
tution level, the faculty member would likely be 
offered placement within the larger institution. 
Of the schools that discuss where tenure resides, 
53 percent extend tenure only within departments, 
while 31 percent locate it at the institution level. 
 Universities rarely invoke dismissal procedures 
against tenured faculty. Even when initiated, 
they seldom result in dismissal. In recent decades, 
only about 50 tenured professors (out of roughly 
325,000 nationwide, or less than 0.01 percent) 
have been dismissed for reasons such as incompe-
tence or moral turpitude each year.63
Other Career and Reward Opportunities
In both the civil service and higher education, ten-
ure is one of many rewards that institutions offer 
to encourage the recruitment, retention, and high 
performance of top employees. To some extent in the 
civil service, but especially at universities, tenure is 
but one of a dynamic array of incentives and rewards 
available to staff members who excel. 
 → The federal civil service operates based on a 
well-defined set of levels that clarify employees’ re-
sponsibilities, status, and pay opportunities. As in 
K–12 education, most federal positions have speci-
fied pay ranges through which employees advance 
at regular intervals. Promotion to new positions 
within a department — which often come with 
higher pay rates — is based on merit.64 In some fed-
eral jobs, performance is a larger determinant of 
pay within each job, without promotion; in these, 
pay grades are designed in much larger bands, 
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and an individual’s movement through a band is 
based on formal performance review.65 The fed-
eral employment system offers a large number of 
positions that, altogether, provide a rich menu of 
advancement options for employees.66 While the 
reward systems are not as robust as many in higher 
education and the private sector, they offer bet-
ter performers continual opportunity to advance 
along career tracks within jobs, and a multitude of 
job advancement options across departments. 
 → Most universities offer a series of recognitions for 
achievement, including different levels of professor-
ship (assistant, associate, and full professor), named 
positions (“chairs”) that confer prestige and extra 
pay, special program and center directorships, and 
departmental leadership roles. Furthermore, each of 
these “brass rings” conveys differing levels of pres-
tige based on the reputation of the university, de-
partment, or program. Associated pay differs based 
on a combination of standard university pay pack-
ages and specially-funded pay. Lower-ranked uni-
versities are able to compete by offering powerful, 
prestigious, or funded positions such as endowed 
chairs and center or program leadership roles. 
 In this context, college and university faculty 
regularly leave positions to seek higher pay and 
prestige at better-regarded institutions. Others 
leave less-secure positions in the best universities 
for the safety and high regard of tenured, endowed 
positions at less-prestigious universities. Some give 
up the prospect of tenure at lower-ranked universi-
ties to remain in the most prestigious universities 
without tenure. Tenure is just one part of this dy-
namic system of rewards for excellent performers.
 In higher education as in any sector, however, 
what is rewarded is what gets done. The most 
prestigious universities typically value research 
over teaching, not just for conferring tenure, 
but for other rewards as well. Higher education 
institutions have generally shifted the weight of 
tenure decisions from teaching and service toward 
a stronger emphasis on scholarship.67 For example, 
more than 62 percent of all English and foreign 
language departments in a recent survey reported 
that publication increased in importance between 
1995 and 2005.68 The percentage ranking scholar-
ship over teaching more than doubled, from 35 
percent in 1968 to 76 percent in 2005.69 This shift 
has not been limited to research and doctoral 
institutions; other colleges and universities have 
also increased their focus on publication in recent 
years to enhance their own prestige.70
Higher Education Civil Service k–12 Teaching
Time to tenure 5 to 7 years (varies by 
institution)
1 year (most federal 
agencies)
3 years typical; states range from 
1 to 5 with exception of Ohio (7)
Criteria for tenure High (varies by 
institution)
Low Low
Process for tenure Extensive, multifaceted Minimal; automatic Minimal; automatic
Tenure protections Very high Very high Very high
Other career and reward 
opportunities
Tenure is part of a 
dynamic array of rewards 
for high performers 
High performers can 
receive promotions and 
raises; have opportunities 
for new challenges at 
other agencies
Few opportunities for promotion 
or pay advancement beyond 
salary schedule, unless teacher 
becomes administrator
table 1. Key Design Elements of Tenure Systems in Higher Education, the Civil Service and k–12
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Several states, the federal government, and many colleges and universities have begun re-forming job protections and tenure in response 
to shifting rationales and changing organizational 
demands. In recent years, the degree of job protec-
tion and frequency of tenure awards has decreased in 
both sectors.
 → At the federal level, recent legislation gave the 
departments of Homeland Security and Defense 
increased discretion in agency personnel matters, 
decreasing job protections and appeal rights for 
thousands of federal civil service employees.71 
 → At the state level, several states — including Texas, 
Florida, South Carolina, Arkansas, and Georgia 
— have moved largely to at-will employment for 
civil service workers.72 Other states are also mov-
ing away from traditional civil service systems for 
large groups of employees: At-will employment 
now covers 48 percent of state workers in Idaho; 
40 percent in Kansas; 35 percent in Colorado; 33 
percent in Oklahoma; 30 percent in West Vir-
ginia; and more than 20 percent in Ohio, Wash-
ington, and Illinois.73 
 For hundreds of thousands of workers in fed-
eral agencies and state and local government, how-
ever, job protections in the civil service remain in 
place, with designs very similar to their historical 
roots.
 Studies of the impact of reform in these states 
have revealed some increase in the number of 
dismissals — or a decrease in the time it takes to 
dismiss underperforming employees — but the 
jury is still out on whether decreased job protec-
tions in reform states improve agencies’ overall 
performance.74 Reviewing the available literature 
in 2007, Condrey and Battaglio concluded that 
“insufficient time, confounding effects, and in-
adequate databases preclude rigorous empirically 
grounded answers to the question of whether 
radical civil service reform has improved service 
delivery.”75 It is also too soon to tell whether these 
reforms increase politically-motivated hires or 
dismissals.76
 → University employment also has undergone sig-
nificant changes over the past decade. Visiting, 
adjunct, and instructor positions are proliferating 
at U.S. universities, while tenure-track jobs are 
becoming rarer.77 This is due primarily to eco-
nomic forces — non-tenure-track positions com-
mand lower rates and customarily come without 
benefits — but schools have also pursued the shift 
because of perceived organizational benefits to 
limiting the role of research faculty in instruc-
tion, especially in introductory-level courses.78 For 
those hired into tenure tracks, higher education 
institutions have begun to shift the weight of 
tenure decisions from teaching and service to-
ward a stronger emphasis on scholarship.79 Other 
than this shift, the fundamentals of tenure have 
changed little since the 1940s. 
Recent Trends in the Civil Service  
and Higher Education
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Here we offer options for making tenure a better contributor to student outcomes in K–12 education, applying lessons about 
job protections in the civil service and university set-
tings while considering the urgent need to improve 
student learning in the U.S. The two major paths 
are reforming tenure and eliminating tenure while 
adding other enticements to attract and retain 
effective teachers. Table 2 summarizes the range of 
options for reforming tenure elements, and Table 
3 presents one model of tenure reform focused on 
growing the size and power of an elite teaching corps.
States have limited powers to remove tenure from 
teachers who already have it, but they can leap into 
the future with tenure approaches for new teachers 
that fit the demands of education today. Some may 
choose to pair tenure reform with significant career 
and pay opportunities that encourage teachers to vol-
untarily relinquish tenure.
Option 1: Redesign Tenure
Many in education will choose to preserve tenure for 
teachers, or at least some level of due process rights 
exceeding employment at-will. Eliminating tenure 
entirely, whether all at once or more gradually, will 
not be politically feasible in many places. Fortu-
nately, a significantly redesigned tenure system has 
the potential to support a highly effective teaching 
workforce. A renewed tenure system could help grow 
and empower the ranks of our nation’s best teachers. 
To envision a new and improved tenure system, 
we consider options for each design element in turn.
Time to Tenure. Perhaps the simplest reform is ex-
tending the time before teachers are considered for 
tenure, allowing for more complete evaluation of 
fully-developed performance. As the civil service 
and university settings show, there is no standard 
or known ideal number of years before an employee 
should be eligible for tenure. Therefore, decisions 
about timing should be based on relevant factors 
such as when meaningful evaluation data are avail-
able and the typical time it takes for employees to 
display their contributions as trained professionals. 
As states and districts increasingly put value-
added data to use in educators’ evaluations, requir-
ing additional years before making tenure decisions 
could improve the reliability of the teacher outcome 
data upon which those evaluations are based.80 Re-
search also suggests that teachers typically have steep 
growth curves in their first five years.81 Evaluating 
them for tenure at that point, rather than in their de-
veloping years, would enable decisions based on data 
that better predicts long-term performance. Longer 
Tenure Reform Options in K–12
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time to tenure would allow districts to see not just 
how strong a teacher’s performance is in one or two 
years, but how consistent from year to year as well. 
Longer time to tenure also opens the door to ear-
lier recognition and rewards for strong performance 
before tenure, putting tenure in its place as just one 
of many rewards for better teaching. This is akin 
to the opportunity that university faculty members 
have to move from assistant to associate professor in 
their early years before earning tenure.
Criteria for Tenure. Leaders can send the strongest 
signal about the meaning of tenure by increasing the 
rigor of the criteria for earning it — thereby limit-
ing the number of teachers who receive tenure, and 
transforming it into an award that confers status 
and respect. Enhanced rigor can include increas-
ing the number of criteria to cover complete job 
performance, the quality of the measures for each 
criterion, clarity about their relative weight in tenure 
decisions, and the standards for tenure-worthy per-
formance. In all cases, criteria for tenure should be 
linked to broader teacher evaluation systems, which 
many states and districts are now revamping.82 Rigor 
needs to be more than just on paper: actual tenure 
decisions must reflect whether teachers meet more 
stringent standards. As a result, the tenure-granting 
process, discussed below, is as important as the crite-
ria themselves.
Considerations for reformers who want to in-
crease the rigor of tenure criteria meaningfully in-
clude the following (see Public Impact’s earlier work 
on performance measurement for more detail)83:
w w w. o p p o r t u n i t y c u lt u r e . o r g t e a c h e r  t e n u r e  r e f o r m | 15
→ Including a battery of criteria that fully reflect 
contributions needed from teachers will result 
in more meaningful tenure decisions. Potential 
tenure criteria include teachers’ impact upon stu-
dent learning and other valued student outcomes; 
teachers’ skills and competencies correlated with 
student outcomes (e.g., teamwork and leadership 
of peers); and other contributions teachers make 
to their schools and the profession. 
 → Giving objective measures of student learning 
the heaviest weight will keep academic learning 
in the fore and drive continued improvement in 
student assessment. Some reformers may want to 
treat learning results as a minimum threshold, to 
deny tenure for teachers who fall short in this area 
despite other contributions. Improving the quality 
of student testing to include application of skills 
and knowledge to analytical, conceptual, and 
creative problems will help reduce resistance and 
make the case for such a threshold even stronger.
 → Assessing criteria with multiple measures will 
give a complete picture of each teacher’s contribu-
tions. This is the next level of detail beneath the 
criteria. For example, student learning growth can 
be assessed with multiple-choice tests of knowl-
edge and skill and also with standardized rubric 
scoring of more complex student work. Balancing 
multiple sources and measurement tools with the 
feasibility and value of each source is essential. 
Measures that are not themselves student out-
comes should still correlate highly with those 
outcomes, both for teachers individually and 
across whole schools. None should be inversely or 
lightly correlated with student learning, keeping 
the focus instead on measuring teacher differences 
that matter most.
 → Measuring consistency of performance over sev-
eral years will require a longer time frame, making 
increased time before tenure decisions a comple-
mentary change. 
Tenure systems in higher education provide a cau-
tionary tale. Faculty tenure criteria stand head and 
shoulders above those in the civil service for promot-
ing a performance culture. Yet even in the university 
setting, some reformers have called for abolishing 
tenure because it often rewards the quantity of jour-
nal publications over quality, as well as scholarship 
over teaching excellence.84
Fortunately, more sophisticated and balanced as-
sessments of teachers’ impact on student learning are 
becoming increasingly possible as states and districts 
dramatically improve their evaluation systems. How 
high should the tenure-worthy standard be for 
each criterion or measure? The answer depends on 
the proportion of teachers on whom education lead-
ers want to confer tenure. State and district leaders 
have at least two routes to pursue. Each sends differ-
ent signals about what education leaders value, and 
would likely have different effects on student out-
comes over time, as well:
 → “Inclusive Tenure” would increase the standards 
for tenure just enough to preclude tenure for the 
least effective teachers. Under this design, tenure 
would be reserved for the top 75 percent or so of 
teachers in a district or state — those who never 
dip into bottom ranks of progress in the early 
years of their career. This design, where most 
states appear to be headed today as they revise 
their evaluation systems, does not provide a dis-
tinct opportunity for teachers at the top. But it 
does remove job protections for those at the bot-
tom. As other researchers have shown, encourag-
ing the exit of the least effective teachers alone 
would have a significant positive impact on stu-
dent learning.85
 → “Elite Tenure” would set high standards for ten-
ure, so that it is reserved for teachers consistently 
performing at the highest levels (e.g., ranking 
among the top 10 percent to 25 percent in a sub-
ject).86 This design would explicitly seek to retain 
these teachers, not just to serve in the classroom 
but to set the cultural tone within schools, across a 
district or state, and within the profession at large. 
Concomitant awards could include opportunities 
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for increased pay and power over future tenure 
decisions and other policy and human resource 
decisions. This tenure system is most aligned with 
an “opportunity culture,” in which top teachers 
are able to reach more students and gain dispro-
portionate decision-making power and rewards.87 
Table 3 presents some initial thoughts about how 
this kind of tenure could work by providing one 
example of elite tenure design.
What are the implications for teachers who do 
not receive tenure? Some may be ill-suited to any 
role within education, particularly those teachers 
not chosen under inclusive tenure systems. But many 
will be capable of serving effectively in more limited 
roles, such as supervising some students’ independent 
work while another teacher provides group instruc-
tion; tutoring small groups without responsibility for 
managing whole-class behavior; and working under 
the direction and with the methods and tools of top 
teachers. Limited roles for these teachers would be 
similar to some in the university setting, where non-
tenure-track faculty members engage in a portion of 
the roles expected of their tenured colleagues. Many 
good teachers could increase their positive effect on 
students this way, even if tenure was not part of the 
employment package.
Process for Tenure. The overarching goal for the 
tenure granting process is ensuring that it leads to 
grants of tenure as planned, creating the intended 
staffing quality improvements. Design elements 
include the number of levels of review, the motiva-
tion reviewers have to make selective decisions, and 
whether there is a presumption of tenure. The many 
possible levels of review include principals or other 
supervisors within schools, peer teams, district 
supervisors of schools, district teams specifically re-
sponsible for tenure, district legal departments, and 
the school board or school board representatives. 
Reviewers can be motivated by specific rules for re-
view for which they will be held accountable or, more 
intrinsically, by a professional interest in maintaining 
a high standard. 
Inclusive and elite tenure designs would need to 
differ on these elements: 
 → Inclusive tenure likely should be awarded by 
formula. Teachers whose performance ratings are 
not above a set threshold for a particular num-
ber of years would presumptively not be granted 
tenure.88 All other teachers would receive tenure 
automatically, much as they do today. Several 
states are moving toward this kind of process to 
award tenure to fewer low-performing teachers.89 
In inclusive systems, districts would bear the bur-
den of collecting and reporting performance data 
to exclude a portion of the least effective teachers. 
This type of formulaic process would rely primar-
ily on student performance data and possibly 
quantitative ratings of teachers from other evalua-
tion steps, eliminating the need for multiple layers 
of review and requiring less motivation and skill 
among high-level decision-makers to apply the cri-
teria rigorously every time. 
 → Elite tenure, with its high bar for tenure awards, 
would operate on a presumption of non-tenuring. 
In an elite system, teachers would apply for tenure 
and bear the burden of making their case. Because 
the criteria for an award under this system would 
likely include not only consistently high perfor-
mance ratings and student outcomes, but also 
qualitative factors requiring subjective judgments, 
it would require more discretion by decision-
makers. State and district leaders should engage 
elite teachers who have already earned tenure in 
decisions about the future corps, magnifying the 
prevalence and cultural impact of characteristics 
that are recognized by tenure. Many have called 
for inclusion of teachers in the design of new ten-
ure systems. But the habits and values of the most 
successful teachers should influence change the 
most. 
In a truly elite system, the majority of employees 
who have already met the high standard feel moti-
vated to protect it — and the reputation of tenure 
status — by keeping the standards for future entrants 
w w w. o p p o r t u n i t y c u lt u r e . o r g t e a c h e r  t e n u r e  r e f o r m | 17
high. Engaging top teachers in decisions about ten-
ure awards would not only give them disproportion-
ate power over the future of schools, but would also 
help retain more of the best and increase the total 
number of truly stellar staff in public schools. Screen-
ing by a higher body and possibly a legal team could 
reduce cronyism and address legal concerns.
Tenure Protections. When policymakers contem-
plate changing procedural protections, the con-
stitutional requirements for due process typically 
set the minimum level of protection that teachers 
receive. But in most states, the job protections that 
accompany tenure awards exceed constitutional 
requirements, leaving room for these protections 
to be revised.90 State and district policymakers can 
change tenure protections on a few fronts by altering 
the dismissal process: the number of steps, the time 
required, and the grounds for dismissal. The right 
combination can help reduce the negative impact 
on schools of the employer’s burden of proof for dis-
missal and increase the dismissal of staff who should 
not be working in schools.
 → Steps and time required. Policymakers could 
reduce tenure protections harmful to students 
and increase the ease of addressing egregious per-
formance problems simply by streamlining the 
review process for attempted dismissal. Fewer lev­
els of review on the majority of cases and less time 
between each review would make dismissal cases 
less onerous and costly, while still ensuring review 
for teachers’ protection. Changing policies about 
timeliness would not be sufficient; policymakers 
would also need to hold reviewers accountable for 
carrying out timely reviews in practice. 
 → Grounds. Policymakers can also ensure that the 
eligible grounds for teacher dismissal include all 
of the reasons for dismissing a teacher in the in-
terests of students and the school’s performance. 
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At a minimum, these should include a teacher’s 
documented ineffectiveness in the classroom, 
breaches of ethical standards, and behavior that 
disrupts student learning or school operations. 
Careful and complete articulation of grounds that 
give employers significantly more discretion can 
make up for the employer’s burden of proof that 
often prevents dismissal of staff who, by any com-
monsense standard, should not be working with 
or near children and other staff. If the state or dis-
trict has enunciated many potential grounds for 
dismissal under tenure, then even if the burden of 
proof is on the employer, the effective burden shifts 
to the employee to perform and behave within 
the expected boundaries. In effect, this would re-
duce employers’ hesitation to dismiss persistently 
underperforming teachers, while maintaining the 
burden to document and explain the unacceptable 
behavior or performance to a neutral third party. 
 → Burden of proof. Tenure vests teachers with a 
property right to continued employment. When 
initiating dismissal, therefore, the employer bears 
the burden of showing reasons for dismissal. Em-
ployers cannot shift the burden to the employee to 
defend against dismissal, unless the employment 
is actually “at will” and not a grant of a right to 
employment (i.e., tenure as recognition, but not a 
right). This is a complex area of constitutional and 
employment law. Reformers must examine the na-
ture of the rights that tenure confers in each state, 
and determine whether and how those rights may 
be changed. Making the grounds broader and eas-
ier to document could help balance the burden and 
increase employers’ ability to make decisions in the 
best interests of students and remaining staff.
Other Career and Reward Opportunities. A signifi-
cant opportunity for changing tenure’s effect is to 
make it but one of numerous rewards and opportuni-
ties for better teachers. Nonselective tenure does not 
attract, motivate, or retain better performers dispro-
portionately. In contrast, other rewards and oppor-
tunities for better teachers could. These could start 
early for staff who perform very well in the first year 
and last throughout instructional careers for those 
who sustain and increase their contributions. Re-
wards and opportunities that may attract, motivate, 
and retain very effective teachers include these:
 → Opportunities to teach more students in exchange 
for additional pay
 → Reduction of noninstructional duties to enable 
reaching more students
 → Decision-making power over hiring, promotion, 
and tenure of others
 → Opportunities to supervise or manage other 
teachers to improve their effectiveness
 → Professional development/coaching /mentoring 
responsibility for other teachers
 → Title enhancement (advanced, master, lead, etc.)
 → Opportunities to participate in or lead policy and 
instructional practice reforms
 → Other recognition and rewards for sustained ex-
cellence in performance
 → Higher pay to reflect higher contributions to stu-
dent outcomes, including most of the items above
Opportunities to reach more children and directly 
influence the effectiveness of peers, in particular, are 
not just rewards, but also ways to magnify the effects 
of great teachers and retain them longer, if accompa-
nied by higher pay. But higher pay for higher contri-
bution will require shifting funds from less-effective 
staff, particularly those who contribute the least to 
student learning, making tenure and pay policy re-
form imperative.
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Design Element
Design Continuum
Employee Security         Organizational Discretion
Time to Tenure
 Time 




(e.g., 3 to 6 years)
Long  
(e.g., 7 years or longer)
Criteria for Tenure
 Rigor Easy Criteria Moderate Criteria Stringent Criteria
 Number Few Criteria More Criteria Many Criteria
Tenure Process
 Levels of Review One Level of Review Multiple Levels  
of Review
Many Levels of Review
 Decision-Makers’   
 Motivation to Make   
 Selective Decisions
Weak Motivation Moderate Motivation Strong Motivation
 Presumption of  
 Tenure?
Yes: Burden on Employer  
to Deny
N/A No: Burden on Applicant
Tenure Protections
 # of Steps to Dismiss Many Steps to Dismiss Few Steps to Dismiss One Step to Dismiss
 Time Required to  
 Dismiss
Long Time to Dismiss Moderate Time  
to Dismiss
Short Time to Dismiss
 Burden of Proof On Employer to Prove N/A On Employee to Defend (at-will 
employment only)
 Grounds for Dismissal Few Grounds — 
egregious acts only
More Grounds for 
Dismissal
Many Grounds — ethics, 
performance, behavior, etc.
Other Career and Reward Opportunities
 Including:
 Career Advancement 
 Reach Extension 
 Other Recognition
 Pay
Few Some — in addition  
to tenure
Many — career advancement 
levels, pay, and recognition 
act in concert with tenure 
to reward excellence and 
contribution, and to extend 
the reach of the best to more 
children; begins early and lasts 
throughout career
table 2. Tenure Design Elements
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Tenure Design Element Reasoning
Time to Tenure 
• 6 years
New teacher learning curve flattens by year 5. Extra year allows gauging consis-




“Elite tenure” awards to the top 10%–25% provide job protection only for teachers 
who consistently achieve the best student outcomes and enhance peer effective-
ness. These teachers are in short supply, and any recruiting or retention entice-
ments focused on this group specifically will benefit children. Many criteria provide 
a complete picture of contributions for tenure review and allow reviewers to plot 
likely career advancement paths. 
Tenure Process
•  Levels of Review: Minimum 
three levels of review
•  Decision-Makers’ Motivation 
to Make Selective Decisions: 
Strong
• Presumption of Tenure? No
Minimum three-level review by elite peers charged with preserving the tenure 
standards, district-level team committed to rigorous standards, and legal team 
to ensure compliance. Decision-makers must have strong incentives to hold high 
standards in order to confer status and make funding of tenure viable by awarding 
it only to teachers worthy of extending their reach to more children. The applicant 
must bear the burden of proving worthiness for tenure. However, districts should 
encourage tenure application by high-performing teachers as a retention tool and 
also play a role in gathering performance data or ensuring its accuracy. 
Tenure Protections
• # of Steps to Dismiss: Few
•  Time Required to Dismiss:  
As short as possible
• Grounds for Dismissal: Many 
•  Burden of Proof for  
Dismissal: On employer 
The primary purpose in this version of elite tenure is conveying status and opening 
the door to future career opportunities, not job protection. However, job protec-
tions in the form of due-process rights still significantly exceed those of at-will em-
ployment, and the burden remains on the employer to demonstrate that dismissal 
is warranted. The selection process will have eliminated many but not all employees 
who have chronic or recurring performance challenges in one or more critical areas 
(instruction, peer collaboration, etc.). When a performance problem arises such 
that termination is the best option for children and the school community, the elite 
group of tenured peers that plays a role in deciding tenure will need to protect its 
reputation. Rapid, clear steps that bring evidence of performance problems to a 
neutral judge are best for students, as are a wide range of grounds that cover the 
ways in which an individual’s behavior at work may compromise the school’s mis-
sion. Broad grounds for dismissal — ethics, performance, behavior, etc. — put the 
onus on tenured employees to maintain performance and professional behavior. 
Some reformers might choose to couple higher protections with very strict criteria 
for elite teacher tenure, e.g., limiting it to those consistently in the top 10%.
Other Career and Reward  
Opportunities:  
Many — beginning early and 
lasting throughout careers, 
the recognition of exemplary 
performance, career advance-
ment, reach extension to more 
students, and pay should act in 
concert with tenure to reward 
excellence and contribution. 
Tenure should be but one of numerous rewards for teachers who make increas-
ingly valuable contributions to student outcomes. Tenure review should not be 
the first recognition or opportunity that a teacher receives for teaching well and/or 
enabling strong peer performance. An elite tenure review process can be one trig-
ger for formal planning about different career paths that fit each individual’s com-
petencies; how each top teacher can reach more children along those career paths; 
and pay opportunities — for extending their reach to more children, supervising 
other teachers, or improving student outcomes in other ways within budget.
table 3. “Elite Tenure” Design Example
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Option 2: Eliminate Tenure
Although tenure is prevalent in the sectors discussed 
here, employees in most sectors work under employ-
ment at will, without heightened due process protec-
tions. Thus, some reformers will aim for elimina-
tion of tenure to meet the emerging needs of K–12 
education. 
Arguably, the main purposes for which K–12 ten-
ure was created are less compelling today, and the 
costs of tenure as we know it to children and our na-
tional economy are great. 
 → Increased public transparency makes a return to 
teacher hiring as part of the political appointment 
machinery unlikely in most locales. 
 → Civil rights and other protections, not in exis-
tence when tenure first emerged, protect existing 
teachers from the same unfair terminations disal-
lowed in other employment settings. 
 → As a women’s rights tool, tenure has failed. The 
lack of paid advancement opportunity in tradi-
tional K–12 instructional roles, inhibited by nearly 
universal tenure, is a thick glass ceiling. The com-
bination of tenure with automatic pay increases 
for years of service locks up large sums of money 
to pay less-effective teachers as much as the best, 
money that in most professions would be used to 
pay the best more. 
 → The economic rationale for tenure has become 
blunted in part by generous health and retirement 
benefits packages in education, which surpass 
those available in most sectors. 
 → School systems have increasing numbers of re-
ward tools available to pay some teachers more, 
such as extra compensation for service in hard-to-
staff schools and subject areas, a growing number 
of performance pay plans, and other departures 
from traditional pay schedules. These tools fur-
ther undercut the economic rationale for tenure 
and are more focused on ways to reward people 
for entering schools and positions where they are 
most needed and for doing well with students. 
 → Emerging efforts to extend the reach of the best 
teachers to more students may produce addi-
tional pay opportunities for better teachers within 
instructional roles, closing the compensation gap 
for the best teachers and replacing tenure’s recruit-
ing and retention roles.91 
At the same time, ensuring that every teacher 
achieves strong student outcomes has become more 
compelling than ever. Our nation has begun to grasp 
that widespread educational opportunity is not just 
a matter of moral rightness, but is imperative to our 
national economic stability.92 Simultaneously, analy-
sis has revealed that students who start school behind 
can catch up — but having multiple great teachers 
over their early years is the critical factor.93 Attracting 
and keeping the best teachers is therefore essential, as 
is reducing the presence and impact of their lowest-
performing peers. Awarding what amounts to a life-
time job guarantee to even a single ineffective K–12 
teacher can unnecessarily doom hundreds — even 
thousands — of students to poor instruction.
Awarding a lifetime job guarantee to 
even one ineffective K–12 teacher dooms 
hundreds — sometimes thousands — 
of children to bad instruction, devastat- 
ing fragile learners.
The lack of paid advancement opportun-
ity in K–12 instructional roles is a nearly 
universal glass ceiling attributable in part  
to the costs and culture of tenure.
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Where eliminating tenure is politically feasible, it 
is a rapid way to free schools and districts from the 
financial and student learning costs of tenure. Elimi-
nating tenure all at once, however, may be legally 
impossible or politically impractical in most places. 
One alternative is to eliminate tenure for new hires, 
while retaining it for those already in the system. 
Another option is to eliminate tenure for new hires, 
while offering current teachers a choice between the 
potential for higher pay (such as through substantial 
awards based on performance) without enhanced job 
protections, or continuation of existing job protec-
tions and current pay scales.94
Leaders taking this route should prepare in ad-
vance to replace tenure with rewards and career 
opportunities that favor better teachers. To support 
this type of reform, policymakers will also need to 
provide flexibility in state statutes for districts to 
pursue different approaches to tenure reform and pay 
systems, and allocate funding to encourage them. 
States should make more money available for bolder 
reforms that also address pay and career advance-
ment opportunities within instruction. Federal 
policymakers also can incent change by allocating 
funding to performance pay systems that provide 
greater opportunity to teachers who opt out of exist-
ing tenure systems.
Conclusion 
Regardless of whether and how tenure is reformed, 
it should be neither the beginning nor the end of 
the achievement road for teachers — especially the 
best. Top teachers need a much richer set of oppor-
tunities for achievement, impact, and recognition 
of their continued commitment and contribution 
throughout their careers, with the option to continue 
their direct impact on instruction. As we begin to 
see shifts from the current monolithic delivery of 
instruction to models that increase the reach and im-
pact of the best teachers, tenure will likely disappear 
or become only one of many rewards and recogni-
tions for staff who contribute more to student learn-
ing, peer effectiveness, and the profession.
Tenure reformers must make decisions about each 
design element. Table 2 summarizes these elements 
along broad continua ranging from employee secu-
rity at one end to broader organization discretion at 
the other. From among these options, state and dis-
trict leaders who are eager to reform tenure in ways 
that improve student outcomes will find multiple 
paths to support different philosophies and political 
realities.
Tenure must go—or be put in its place 
as one of many career opportunities 
and rewards for better teaching. 
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